

**Board of Pilot Commissioners  
for the Bays of  
San Francisco,  
San Pablo, and Suisun**



**2013**

**Annual Legislative Report**

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I.

**I. Introduction**

Section 1157.5 of the Harbors and Navigation Code was added to the code by Senate Bill 1217 (2008) and mandates that the Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo, and Suisun (Board) submit an annual report to the Secretary of the Senate, the Chief Clerk of the Assembly and the Secretary of the California Transportation Agency describing the Board's activities for the preceding calendar year and providing certain specified information.

The statutory provision calls for reporting on the number of vessel movements across the bar, on the bays, and on the rivers within the Board's jurisdiction; the names of pilots and trainees and license status; and, summaries of closed and open misconduct or navigational incident reports.

The following report is hereby submitted in compliance with the cited provision.

The report has been prepared with the collaboration of the following officials:

Allen Garfinkle, Executive Director  
Kelly Dolcini, Staff Services Analyst

April 7, 2014

## **II. Summary of Major Board Activities in Calendar Year 2013**

### **Overview**

Effective July 1, 2013, the Board became a constituent entity of the California State Transportation Agency (CalSTA) in accordance with the Governor's Reorganization Plan No. 2. Prior to this transition, the Board of Pilot Commissioners was a part of the former Business, Transportation, and Housing Agency.

### **Discussion**

#### **1. Pilot Fitness.**

Following the findings in the COSCO BUSAN incident in which prescription drug use was found to be a factor, weaknesses in the pilot fitness determination (physical examination) process were also identified. After contracting with the University of California, San Francisco Medical Center Department of Occupational Medicine to conduct a pilot fitness study and prepare a report, the Board constructed a new pilot fitness regime by administrative regulations. The study, consideration of the recommendations, and drafting new regulations occurred over a three-year period, and the new regulations became effective April 1, 2014.

Key components of the Board-approved pilot fitness regulations focus are as follows:

- The regulations instituted the newest U.S. Coast Guard medical guidelines as the medical standard for conducting the fitness for duty determinations of pilot and pilot trainees;
- The regulations identified minimum and desired qualifications for Board appointed physicians, including ensuring that the physicians are personally familiar with the physical and cognitive challenges encountered by pilot licensees;
- The regulations established requirements that go beyond a traditional physical examination, and require pilots and pilot trainees to undertake an agility test that simulates the physical demands of providing pilotage service, and to submit to toxicological tests that include testing for anti-depressants, anti-psychotics, anti-convulsants, barbiturates, amphetamines, benzodiazepines, sedative hypnotics, opiates and other pain medications;
- The regulations established a requirement that pilots and pilot trainees inform the Board of the onset of a new medical condition diagnosed by a physician or a current medical condition which impairs, to an appreciable degree, the ability of the individual to conduct his or her piloting duties;

- The regulations appoint a Medical Review Officer whose duties will be reviewing fitness for duty determinations made by an examining physician, undertake annual peer review of the Board-appointed examining physicians, and provide advice to the Board on matters relating to pilot fitness.

## **2. Personnel Matters.**

Through 2012 and most of 2013, the Assistant Director position remained unfilled. Recruiting and appointment of a new Assistant Director by the Secretary of CalSTA was concluded in October, 2013 and a new Assistant Director began work on October 31, 2013, at which time the Board became fully staffed at four staff.

## **3. Legislation and Legislative Hearings Affecting the Board in 2013.**

Senate Bill 1408 was passed and approved by the Governor on September 29, 2012. It made changes to the Harbors and Navigation Code (Code), principally as follows:

- A pilot shall “refuse a pilotage assignment if he or she is physically or mentally fatigued and has a reasonable belief that the assignment cannot be carried out in a competent and safe manner,” and that “in order to ensure and promote the highest level of safety in pilotage, the board is empowered to effectively monitor and oversee the practices of pilots and prevent fatigue resulting from extended hours of service, insufficient rest within a 24-hour period, and disruption of circadian rhythms.”
- Additionally, any continuing education program adopted by the board shall include a section on the hazards of effective strategies to prevent fatigue while on duty.
- The executive director of the Board shall report any safety standard violations to the United States Coast Guard, and if he has reason to believe that the violation will not be corrected prior to the vessel reaching its next port of call, he shall request the United States Coast Guard to report the suspected safety standard violation to the port state control officer or a pilot organization in an expected future port of call.
- At the time of the physical examination required by Code, pilots and trainees shall disclose to the Board-appointed physician conducting a physical exam if he or she has prior to the examination:
  - Been rendered incapable of safely operating a vessel or any other motor vehicle because of alcoholism, excessive and chronic use of alcoholic beverages, or addiction to, or habitual use of, any drug;
  - Addicted to the use of narcotic drugs or participated in a narcotic treatment program; or,

- Suffered from a disorder characterized by lapses of consciousness or has experienced, within the last three years, either a lapse or consciousness or an episode of marked confusion caused by any medical condition that may bring about recurrent lapses, or has any physical or mental disability, disease, or disorder that could affect the safe operation of a vessel.
- The Board may refuse to admit an applicant to the trainee program, or renew or issue a license to any person, if the Board-appointed physician conducting the physical exam determines that the person excessively or habitually uses, or is addicted to, alcoholic beverages, narcotics or dangerous drugs.
- The Board shall participate in the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) pull notice system, which will provide a DMV public record for each pilot and trainee and yearly updates of any action against driving privileges, and obtain a copy of each trainee and pilot's driving record. The Board, after notice and hearing, may refuse to issue, suspend or revoke a pilot's license, or refuse to admit an applicant to the training program or dismiss a trainee from the training program, if that person has been convicted of a violation of Section 23152 (DUI), Section 23153(DUI causing injury) of the Vehicle Code or Section 655 of the Code.
- Funds from the continuing education portion of the board's budget may be used to provide training in the use of portable piloting equipment and software.
- The Board shall contract with an independent entity to conduct a study of the effects of work and rest periods on psychological ability and safety for pilots. In addition, the Board shall, based on the results of, and recommendations contained in the study, promulgate regulations on how to prevent pilot fatigue and ensure the safe operations of vessels.

Many sections of SB 1408 codify practices that are already employed by the Board, including:

- The San Francisco Bar Pilots have in place internal controls aimed at preventing fatigued pilots from taking assignments, and the Port Agent reports monthly to the Board detailing those occasions when a pilot returns to work with less than 12 hours of rest. The Port Agent also reports to the Board fatigue mitigation measures being employed.
- The continuing education that pilots attend includes modules on fatigue recognition and mitigation.
- The Executive Director currently notifies the United States Coast Guard of safety standard violations that remain unresolved after a vessel departs for its next port of call.

The Pilot Fitness Committee of the Board is currently identifying potential providers and scope of work for the fatigue study mandated in SB 1408 and projects to commence the study during the 2014-2015 fiscal year.

**III. Number of Vessel Movements in 2013**

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Subdivision (a) of Section 1157.5 of the Harbors and Navigation Code mandates that the Board report the number of vessel movements across the bar, on the bays, and on the rivers within the Board's jurisdiction. The following are the 2013 vessel movement statistics:

Number of vessel movements across the San Francisco Bar <i>(Includes 8 movements for Monterey Bay)</i>	6,623
Number of vessel movements within the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo and Suisun	1,272
Number of vessel movements on the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers	431

#### IV. List of Status of Pilot Licensees and Trainees in 2013

Pilot Name	Date of Original Licensing	Passed Away	Retired	Fit for Duty	Licensed and Absent for Medical Reasons	Not Fit for Duty	Mandated Manned Model Training	Mandated Combination Course Training	On Active Military Duty	On Leave of Absence	License Suspended
Alden, Bruce	7/2/1993			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/13/13 - 6/22/13				
Aune, Drew	4/1/2009			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				10/6/13 - 10/11/13			
Boriolo, Dan	10/1/1995			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Bridgman, Daniel	4/1/2010			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Burger, Tom	9/4/1991			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Carlier, John	1/20/1989			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				4/14/13 - 4/19/13			
Carlson, Kenneth	1/1/1988			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Carr, Robert	6/28/2013			6/28/13 - 12/31/13				10/6/13 - 10/11/13			
Chapman, David	5/26/1997			1/1/13 - 5/12/13 10/16/13 - 12/31/13	5/13/13 - 7/31/13	8/1/13 - 10/15/13					
Cloes, Don	6/26/2009			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				4/14/13 - 4/19/13			
Coney, Blake	9/1/1993			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Coppo, George	1/1/1992			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/20/13 - 6/29/13				
Dowdle, George	11/1/1993			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/13/13 - 6/22/13				
Favro, Orrin	12/14/2012			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			5/23/13 - 6/1/13	10/6/13 - 10/11/13			
Fawcett, Erik	6/24/2011			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Fuller, Peter	5/1/1998			1/1/13 - 2/26/13 11/22/13 - 12/31/13	2/27/13 - 4/4/13	4/5/13 - 11/22/13					



Gabe, Sean	5/1/1995			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				5/5/13 - 5/10/13			
Greig, William	2/9/1989			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Haggerty, Mark	7/1/1998			1/1/13 - 6/18/13 7/3/13 - 12/31/13	6/19/13 - 7/2/13						
Holl, Tim	9/22/2005	5/18/ 13				1/1/13 - 5/18/13					
Horton, Bruce	5/8/1991			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Hurt, Richard	9/26/2003			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Johnson, Eric	12/14/2012			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			5/23/13 - 6/1/13	10/6/13 - 10/11/13			
Kellerman, Zachary	1/28/2011			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Kelso, Arnold	1/20/1989			1/1/13 - 12/11/13 12/19/13 - 12/31/13	12/12/13 - 12/18/13						
Kenyon, Hugo	7/1/1998			8/28/13 - 12/31/13		1/1/13 - 8/27/13					
Kirk, Roger	4/1/2007			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Kleess, Guy	11/1/2005			1/1/13-1/8/13 9/4/13 - 12/31/13	1/8/13-4/4/13*						4/4/13- 9/4/13
Laakso, Kristopher	8/26/2011			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Larwood, Dan	7/1/1998			1/1/13 - 4/16/13 9/3/13 - 12/31/13	4/17/13 - 5/14/13	5/15/13 - 9/2/13					
Lemke, William	4/1/1993			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				5/5/13 - 5/10/13			
Lingo, Matthew	2/22/2013			2/22/13 - 3/27/13 7/3/13 - 12/31/13	3/28/13 - 7/2/13		5/23/13 - 6/1/13	4/14/13 - 4/19/13			

Livingstone, George	4/24/2008			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/20/13 - 6/29/13				
Long, Joe	7/1/2008			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/20/13 - 6/29/13	5/5/13 - 5/10/13			
MacLachlan, Steve	1/14/1987			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Manes, Mark	6/28/2012			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Martin Jr., Carl	4/1/2010			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
McCloy, Dave	6/1/2008			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/20/13 - 6/29/13	4/14/13 - 4/19/13			
Mclsaac, Peter	1/1/1994			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Melvin, Eddie	4/1/1988			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/20/13 - 6/29/13				
Merritt, David	8/27/2010			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				5/5/13 - 5/10/13			
Miller, Tom	7/1/1987			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Nyborg, Einar	7/1/1995			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Pate, David	4/1/2007			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Pinder, Robert	4/1/1997		08/1/13	1/1/13 - 3/30/13	3/31/2013 - 7/1/13	7/2/13 - 7/8/13		5/5/13 - 5/10/13			
Pinetti, Randall	2/1/2004			6/20/13 - 12/31/13		1/1/13 - 6/19/13					
Ridens, Ray	1/1/2007			1/1/13 - 12/19/13	12/20/13 - 12/31/13						
Roberts, Steve	2/11/1985			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				4/14/13 - 4/19/13			
Robinson, Eric	1/1/2004			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Rocci, Reuben	1/1/2008			1/1/13 - 11/19/13	11/20/13 - 12/31/13		6/13/13 - 6/22/13				
Ruff, Paul	1/28/2011			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Slack, Dustin	7/1/2008			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				4/14/13 - 4/19/13			

Stultz, Joshua	2/24/2012			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Sweeney, Michael	3/28/1985			1/1/13 - 12/18/13		12/19/13 - 12/31/13	6/13/13 - 6/22/13				
Teague, Steve	1/1/2007			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							
Tylawsky, Greg	5/28/2010			1/1/13 - 12/31/13				5/5/13 - 5/10/13			
Wagner, Nancy	3/1/1990			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/13/13 - 6/22/13				
Wainwright, David	7/1/1991			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/20/13 - 6/29/13				
Wehr, Shane	6/1/2008			1/1/13 - 12/31/13			6/13/13 - 6/22/13				
Weiss, David	9/10/1993			1/1/13 - 12/31/13							

**Active Pilots:**                    **60**  
**Retired Pilots:**                **1**  
**Passed Away:**                 **1**

\* Capt. Guy Kleess did not actively pilot on his state license from 1/8/13 through 4/4/13 based on mutual agreement with Port Agent due to circumstances arising from the OVERSEAS REYMAR incident.

<b>Pilot Trainees in 2013</b>			
	<b>Name of Trainee</b>	<b>Date of Beginning Training</b>	<b>Status</b>
1	Carr, Robert	01/01/2011	Finished Training 06/27/13
2	Lingo, Matthew	10/01/2011	Finished Training 02/20/13
3	Sam D'Aloisio	03/01/2013	In Training
4	Cevan LeSieur	04/01/2013	In Training
	2 trainees remaining at the end of 2013.		

## **V. Summary of Reports of Navigational Incidents and Pilot Ladder Safety Standard Violations That Occurred in 2013**

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Subdivision (c) of Section 1157.5 of the Harbors and Navigation Code calls for providing summaries of each report of misconduct or navigational incidents involving pilots, or other matters for which a license issued by the Board may be revoked or suspended. The summaries are required to provide details including the descriptions of findings made by the Incident Review Committee (IRC) and of the resulting action taken by the Board, as well as stating prior reportable incidents of the pilots involved. Accordingly, the navigational incidents that occurred in 2013 are listed below.

### **M/V SOPHIE OLDENDORFF, allision with mooring dolphin, December 14, 2012 Pilot Capt. Stephen MacLachlan**

On the morning of December 14, 2012, Capt. MacLachlan was assigned to pilot the M/V SOPHIE OLDENDORFF from the Port of Richmond to the Port of Redwood City. During the master-pilot exchange, Capt. MacLachlan was informed that the ship had undergone some engine maintenance and he would need to follow specific instructions on breaking in the new components.

The trip proceeded as normal. During the course of turning the ship in the Redwood City turning basin, a very constricted space, the ship's mate on the bow reported that a catwalk structure from the dock had fallen into the water, but he could not tell that the ship had made contact with it or not. Capt. MacLachlan stopped the engines, completed the turn with tugs and docked without further incident.

It was later determined that the bulbous bow of the ship had made contact with a mooring dolphin that supported the catwalk, causing \$600,000 worth of damage. The IRC interviewed the pilot, the master of the ship, and the master of the assist tug MARSHALL FOSS. The IRC concluded that the primary factor that contributed to the allision was the lack of response of the engines, most likely due to low-sulfur fuel, and a secondary factor was the failure of the master of the ship in the master-pilot exchange to communicate to the pilot the limitations on the engine of which he had knowledge. After considering these factors, the IRC determined that Capt MacLachlan had acted reasonably and with the ordinary care of an expert in his profession. The IRC recommended that the Board find no pilot error and close the case with no further action. The Board concurred with the IRC recommendation.

Capt. MacLachlan has been a pilot since 1987 and has no prior incidents.

**M/V OVERSEAS REYMAR, allision with San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge “Echo”  
tower fendering, January 7, 2013  
Pilot: Capt. Guy Kleess**

On the morning of January 7, 2013, the M/T OVERSEAS REYMAR departed Anchorage 9 on San Francisco Bay bound for Sea with an intended course under the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge C-D span. As the ship approached the bridge, visibility quickly reduced to less than 0.1 mile, and Capt. Kleess discovered that the radar beacon on that particular span was not working. He made the decision to alter the course to pass under D-E span.

Because of the poor visibility, Capt. Kleess was pressed to rely more heavily on the electronic aids for the transit under the bridge. Evidence indicated that Capt. Kleess did not fully utilize all the aids at his disposal. Evidence also indicated that the master of the ship allowed himself to be distracted from his duties by a phone call, thereby eliminating himself from the bridge team.

Capt. Kleess misjudged the timing of the turn under the D-E span and underestimated the effect of the current on his turn. The ship’s starboard quarter made contact with the fendering system of E tower.

The ship’s master and chief engineer were interviewed and confirmed that there had been no equipment or system failures contributing to the incident.

A diver’s survey found that there was no indication of damage below the water line or to the propeller. All damage was above the waterline and visible both in and outside the vessel on the starboard quarter of the hull. No tanks were pierced and there was no pollution. The damage to the ship was estimated at approximately \$220,000. There was no damage to the structure of the bridge; the fendering system sustained an estimated \$1.4 million worth of damage.

The IRC found that Capt. Kleess was well rested and noted that alcohol and controlled substance tests were negative.

In its investigation, the IRC concluded that Capt. Kleess did not employ effective bridge resource management, lost situational awareness, and did not utilize all the navigation resources available to him. For these reasons, the IRC recommended that the Board find pilot error in this case and file an accusation for suspension or revocation of license.

The Board met in closed session to discuss the M/T OVERSEAS REYMAR incident. It directed that an accusation be filed for suspension of Capt. Kleess’ license under section 1180 of the Harbors and Navigation Code.

Following the accusation, the Board entered into a stipulated settlement with Capt. Kleess that included suspension of his license for five months, contingent on completion of a bridge resource management course, courses covering radar techniques and emergency shiphandling and 30 observational transits of the Bay Bridge. The settlement also called for two years probation.

Capt. Kleess has been a pilot since 2005 and has three prior incidents.

- M/V SH GRACE, 2009, grounding in the Sacramento Deep Water Channel. No pilot error.
- M/V VOC ROSE, 2009, collision at Stockton Birth 12/13. Pilot error – four trips to Stockton Berth 12/13 under the guidance of an experienced pilot, two trips at night.
- M/V MEDI OSAKA, 2010, grounding in Richmond Inner Harbor – Supervising pilot assigned error as licensed pilot.

**M/V TANCRED, dock damage, January 19, 2013**  
**Pilot: Capt. Drew Aune**

This incident occurred on the evening of January 26, 2013 during the un-docking of the M/V TANCRED from Benicia Berth 2. Upon letting go the lines, the ship was blown approximately 50 feet off the dock. Capt. Aune used a tug to bring the ship back alongside the dock.

Neither the pilot nor the master of the ship was aware of any contact with or damage to the dock or to the vessel.

When the ship was underway, Capt. Aune received word that personnel at the Benicia facility claimed that the bow of the vessel had touched the dock and damaged 100 feet of pipe protecting the dock edge.

Several other pilots submitted statements that they had observed the damage to the dock prior to the arrival of the M/V TANCRED. This information along with reports from the ship's master and crew led the IRC to recommend that the Board find no pilot error and that the incident be closed with no further action. The Board concurred with the IRC recommendation.

Capt. Aune has been a pilot since 2008. He has no prior incidents.

**M/V APL TOKYO, interaction with M/V NYK LYNX, April 23, 2013**  
**Pilot Capt. Raymond Ridens**

On the morning of April 23, 2013, Capt. Ridens boarded the M/V APL TOKYO bound for Oakland Inner Harbor. At the same time, the M/V BEAR MOUNTAIN BRIDGE was also transiting inbound to the Oakland Inner Harbor.

Pilots aboard both vessels communicated and agreed that the M/V APL TOKYO would enter the estuary first, turn and clear the turning basin, and then allow the M/V BEAR MOUNTAIN BRIDGE to make its turn and continue to its designated berth.

During the vessels' transit inbound down the estuary, the M/V NYK LYNX, who was berthed in Oakland's Inner Harbor along the path of the M/V APL TOKYO and M/VBEAR

MOUNTAIN BRIDGE notified Vessel Traffic Service that the vessel had experienced suction and surge due to interaction upon the passing of the M/V APL TOKYO, causing damage to its gangway.

Capt. Ridens reported that he had taken measures to ensure that the speed of his vessel, the M/V APL TOKYO, was reasonable, using tugs to control the speed . The master of the vessel did not express concern at the speed or navigation of the ship and reported that Capt. Ridens was handling the vessel professionally and at a safe speed.

The pilot aboard the M/V BEAR MOUNTAIN BRIDGE, Capt. David Merritt, stated that he had used tugs to control and maintain a speed of between 5.0 and 5.2 knots. He heard the M/V NYK LYNX report its gangway issue and, upon passing, observed a belly in one of its forward lines.

Based on the evidence available, the IRC determined that the M/V BEAR MOUNTAIN BRIDGE had not caused the interaction and its involvement was determined to not be a factor in the damage to the M/V NYK LYNX's gangway.

Due to the fact that the M/V NYK LYNX had shifted post-incident, the IRC was unable to conclude whether it was properly moored at the time of the interaction.

The IRC determined that, although there was damage to the M/V NYK LYNX gangway, Capt. Ridens had exercised prudence and caution while transiting. The fact that the M/V NYK LYNX had moved over five feet, suggests that it may not have been properly moored in such a way as to prevent motion, taking into consideration the anticipated level of traffic in the Oakland Inner Harbor.

In this case, the IRC recommended that the Board find no pilot error and close the case with no further action. The Board concurred with the IRC recommendation.

Capt. Ridens has been a pilot since 2007 and has been involved in one incident.

- M/V BALTIC LEOPARD, 2007 grounding in the Stockton Channel. No pilot error.

**M/V CLAXTON BAY, steering gear damage, May 10, 2013  
Pilot Capt. Michael Sweeney**

On the afternoon of May 10, 2013, while departing Stockton Berth 8 for New York Point, the M/V CLAXTON BAY suffered damage to the steering gear. During the departure the tug ANGIE BRUSCO and tug JULIUS BRUSCO were assisting.

The ANGIE BRUSCO's line parted during a critical time in the departure and the pilot and master disagreed on what action to take, during which time the rudder angle indicator stopped working. Capt. Sweeney ordered the engines stopped while a replacement line was passed from the ANGIE BRUSCO and then the ship maneuvered to the middle of the channel where it dropped anchor.

The steering gear was inspected by classification society inspectors who found that two of the four bolts that connect the rudder stock to the hydraulic actuator were broken. There was no damage to the hull or rudder, no signs of mud on the rudder or indication of impact with the bottom or other objects.

The IRC concluded that it was unlikely that any action by the pilot or the master could have prevented the damage and that any action (or inaction) on the part of the pilot had worsened the damage. The IRC found that Capt. Sweeney's actions were reasonable and prudent and the Board accepted the IRC's recommendation that case be closed with a finding of no pilot error.

Captain Sweeney has been a pilot since 1985 and has been involved in 7 prior incidents.<sup>1</sup>

- M/V MULBERRY WILTON, 2012, interaction with ship moored at Plains Terminal. No pilot error.
- M/V TATJANA, 2011, grounding at the berth in Stockton after the pilot departed. No pilot error.
- M/V CEFALONAIA, 2003, grounding on the San Joaquin River. No pilot error.
- M/V SAKURA, 1999, allusion with rice loading arm in the Port of Sacramento. No pilot error.
- M/V MUNDOGAS EUROPE, 1998, grounding off New York Point. No pilot error.
- M/V COLUMBIA STAR/TUG TITAN, 1994, allusion with Buoy 3, Oakland. No pilot error.
- M/V TRIDENT VENTURE, 1989, grounding near Rio Vista. No pilot error.

**ITB MOKU PAHU, allision with New York Slough channel marker #7  
October 15, 2013, Pilot Capt. Michael Sweeney**

The ITB MOKU PAHU was transiting from Stockton to sea, with a pilot change in the vicinity of New York Point. After the boarding of the pilot that would take the vessel from New York Point to sea, but prior to the pilot relief, the vessel apparently experienced bank suction causing a sheer to starboard. Attempts to correct for this sheer were partly successful and the vessel made contact with New York Slough channel marker #7, damaging the marker. The investigation is ongoing and is estimated to be completed by April 24, 2014.

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<sup>1</sup> There may be some investigations involving Capt. Sweeney prior to 1993 aside from the M/V TRIDENT VENTURE, but these have been archived and were not available for review.



**M/V ESSEX STRAIT, interaction with M/T CHAMPION EXPRESS,  
November 29, 2013, Pilot Capt. Bruce Alden**

While transiting the channel departing Berth #2, Port of Stockton, the passage of the M/V ESSEX STRAIT is alleged to have caused damage to the accommodation ladder of the M/T CHAMPION EXPRESS. The investigation is ongoing and estimated to be completed by April 24, 2014.